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5Chapter 
Politics and power in national REDD+ 
policy processes 
Monica Di Gregorio, Maria Brockhaus, Tim Cronin and  
Efrian Muharrom
•	 Achieving	 emission	 reductions	 through	 REDD+	 requires	 four	





•	 Formulating	 and	 implementing	 e ective	 national	 REDD+	 strategies	 is	
most	challenging	in	those	countries	where	international	actors	are	the	sole	
force	driving	REDD+	policy	processes.






and	 proposed	 implementation	 of	 national	 (and	 federal)	REDD+	 strategies	
in	 seven	 countries:	 Bolivia,	 Brazil,	Cameroon,	 Indonesia,	Nepal,	 Peru	 and	
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Vietnam.	Using	 a	 political	 economy	 lens,	we	 identify	major	 constraints	 to	
e ective	policy	making.	Starting	from	the	main	drivers	of	deforestation	and	
the	particular	contexts	in	each	country,	we	irst	identify	key	features	of	national	
policy	 processes,	 including	 the	 structural	 conditions,	 the	 dominant	 policy	
actors	 and	 the	 processes	 that	 aid	 or	 hamper	 the	 development	 of	 e ective,	
e cient	 and	 equitable	 REDD+	 policies.	 While	 the	 state	 of	 international	
climate	negotiations	 certainly	 a ects	national	policy	processes	on	REDD+,	
in	this	chapter	we	do	not	discuss	the	relationship	between	the	two,	but	focus	
instead	on	the	national	level.
Countries	 engaged	 in	REDD+	policy	 development	 are	 progressing	 at	 very	




be	 expected,	 democratic	 regimes	 present	 more	 open	 and	 inclusive	 policy	






policy	 formulation	 (Figure	 5.1).	 e	 main	 policy	 outputs	 relate	 to	 the	
establishment	of	new	institutions,	procedures	and	capacity	building	linked	to	
readiness	activities	–	concrete	policy	 formulation	and	 implementation	have	
been	 limited	 to	 date.	 e	 slow	 progress	 overall	might	 relect	 the	 delays	 in	
obtaining	 inancing	 from	 global	 climate	 negotiations,	 but	 domestic	 power	
struggles	also	factor	in.	
is	 chapter	 uses	 as	 a	 political	 economy	 analysis	 framework	 based	 on	 the	
‘four	Is’	outlined	in	Chapter	2:	institutions,	ideas,	interests	and	information,	







and	 implementation	 away	 from	 business	 as	 usual	 policy	 approaches	 and	
toward	 supporting	 (directly	 or	 indirectly)	 reduction	 of	 emissions	 from	
deforestation	and	forest	degradation	and	enhancement	of	forest	carbon	stocks	
(Chapter	2).	We	argue	that	four	preconditions	must	be	in	place	to	facilitate	
transformational	 change:	 in	 terms	 of	 interests	 transformational	 change	
requires:	i)	a	high	level	of	autonomy	of	the	state	vis-à-vis	powerful	economic	
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e	 irst	 module	 is	 a	 policy analysis	 that	 investigates	 the	 political	 context	
in	which	national	REDD+	 strategies	 are	developing	 and	 identiies	possible	







change.	We	 look	 at	 how	REDD+	 policy	 debates	 are	 framed	 in	 the	media	
and	compare	the	dominant	discourse	with	counter-discourses	(Hajer	1995;	
Boyko 	 2008).	 Media frames	 are	 “patterns	 of	 cognition,	 interpretation,	
and	 presentation,	 of	 selection,	 emphasis,	 and	 exclusion,	 by	which	 symbol-
handlers	 routinely	 organise	 discourse”	 (Gitlin	 1980:7).	 e	 coding	 and	




comparative	 analysis	 is	 based	 on	 the	 media	 data	 collected	 by	 the	 single	
case	studies.	
5.3 Institutional context, path-dependencies and 
interests 
e	 factors	 constraining	 transformational	 change	 are	 determined	 by	 the	
interplay	 of	 the	 institutional	 arrangements,	 past	 policies	 and	 consolidated	
interests	that	operate	in	sectors	driving	deforestation	and	forest	degradation.	
Together	 these	 build	 path-dependencies	 that	 are	 di cult	 to	 overcome.	 A	
number	of	causes	of	deforestation	and	degradation	have	been	highlighted	in	











Launch of World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
March 2007
Creation of REDD+ Political and Technical Committee





Interministerial committee on climate change at federal level
July 2008
R-PIN Cameroon submission to FCPF
January 2009
Decision No09/MINEP – 




Ministry of Forestry Regulation 
68/2008 on REDD DA
January 2009
• Establishment of REDD Cell





FCPF R-PIN is approved
May 2008
Foundation of Group REDD
May 2009
Creation of REDD technical group 
within national council on CC
October 2008









The Tocantins Letter of 
the “Forum of 
Amazonian Governors”
September 2007







Launch of UN-REDD 
Programme
and PES
Figure 5.1 Key REDD+ policy events by country





Announcement of reduction 
of net deforestation to 0% 
by 2021
March 2010
Accepted as FIP pilot country
September 2009
National REDD network and technical 
working group
July 2009




National workshop “Climate Crisis, REDD+ and Indigenous 
REDD” and the Declaration of Quitos
July 2011
New national forest law approved (regulations and norms still pending)
July 2010
Proposed Amendments to Forest Act 1993
September 2009
Indonesia 26% emission target commitment at G-20 Meeting
September 2011
Presidential Decree no. 61/2011 
on National Plan to reduce GHGs
May 2009
Ministry of Forestry Decree 36/2009 
on carbon sequestration license
September 2009
Validation of meeting document on Cameroon position in CC
December 2009
Presidential decree on (National Observatory of Climate Change) ONACC
December 2009
Feedback meeting on REPAR participation in Copenhagen Conference
May 2010
Letter of Intent between 
Indonesia and Norway
May 2011
Presidential Instruction 10/2011 on 
moratorium of new licenses
December 2009
Cabinet meeting in Kalapathar, near Mount Everest Base Camp
March 2011









Brazilian participation in the 
COP-15 (Interministerial 
meeting with President Lula)
July 2009
Consultation workshops for the 






Regulation of NPCC and economy wide goal of 2 GT 
reduction of emissions by 2020
2010
Multiple actors dialogue on 
National REDD+ strategy
2009
NPCC and voluntary commitments 80% 
REDD in Amazon and 40% in Cerrado
December 2010
Agreement between UN and the Government 
of Bolivia for UN REDD+ Bolivia
April 2010
World Peoples’ Conference on Climate Change
May 2010











Institutional and political path-dependencies
  In r ts (especially related to land use)
• Past policies supporting or clashing with REDD+
• Level of inclusion of political processes
Policy process 
Political coalitions, cooperation or 
contention to move from:
Business as usual
• State capture by DD sectors
• Low inclusiveness in policy 
processes
• International actors dominate 
national policy processes
Transformational change 
• State autonomy from DD 
sectors
• Inclusive policy processes
• State leads policy processes 
* DD: deforestation and forest degradation
Actors’ interests
• Sectors driving DD*




• Beliefs and ideology
• Development model
Figure 5.2 Political economy framework





from	 the	 sectors	 driving	 deforestation	 and	 forest	 degradation	 and	work	 in	
the	 interest	 of	 society	 at	 large	 (Karsenty	 and	Ongolo	 2012).	Autonomy	 of	
the	state	refers	to	the	degree	to	which	state	actors	can	make	policy	decisions	
independently	 from	 various	 sectors.	 e	 form	 that	 autonomy	 takes	 is	 the	
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challenges	 in	 the	development	 and	 e ective	 implementation	of	policies	 on	
REDD+	 (Kanninen	 et al. 2007).	 Illegal	 logging	 and	 unenforced	 laws	 are	
endemic	in	many	tropical	forested	countries	(Brack	2005).	Ongoing	analysis	
indicates	 strong	 links	 between	 forest	 governance	 and	 general	 governance	
conditions	and	their	impact	on	the	REDD+	policy	process	(WRI	2009).	
e	following	analysis	considers	four	main	politico-economic	and	institutional	
conditions:	 i)	 the	 main	 drivers	 of	 deforestation,	 which	 represent	 interests	
supporting	 business	 as	 usual;	 ii)	 policies	 enabling	 or	 hindering	 REDD+	
objectives	 and	 related	 institutional	 arrangements;	 iii)	 the	 autonomy	 of	 the	
state	vis-à-vis	economic	actors	driving	deforestation	and	forest	degradation;	
and	iv)	the	level	of	inclusiveness	of	policy	processes	(Table	5.1).	
e	irst	condition	refers	to	the	drivers of deforestation and forest degradation.	
Agricultural	 expansion,	 including	 cattle	 ranching,	 is	 the	 main	 cause	 of	
deforestation,	 although	 the	 relative	 impact	 of	 large-	 versus	 small-scale	 and	
subsistence	 agriculture	 varies.	 is	 is	 followed	 by	 logging,	 mining	 and	
infrastructure	development	(Table	5.1).	Consequently,	in	order	to	e ectively	
tackle	deforestation	 and	 forest	 degradation,	 policy	makers	need	 to	 identify	
the	main	policy	constraints	in	the	forestry,	agricultural,	cattle	ranching	and	
mining	sectors	and	devise	new	incentive	structures	(see	Box	5.1	for	a	discussion	
on	Brazil).	 e	high	rents	 that	 these	 sectors	command	make	 it	particularly	
di cult	to	redesign	incentives.	While	the	sectors	that	drive	deforestation	and	
forest	 degradation	 are	well	 known,	 quantifying	 the	 impacts	 of	 these	 single	
sectors	on	deforestation	and	forest	degradation	remains	a	challenge	in	most	
countries.
Policies	 that	 support	 drivers	 of	 deforestation	 and	 related	 institutional 



























Table 5.1 Drivers of deforestation, policies that clash/support REDD+ and autonomy of state actors 




Policies that clash with 
REDD+ aims
Policies that support REDD+ Lack of autonomy 















Rural credit for cattle ranching 
(although more limited than 
in the past) or infrastructure 
development (roads and 
dams); poor enforcement of 
tenure rules
Forest Code conservation 
requirement on private land; 
improved enforcement of land 
use policies (including protected 
areas); economic and ecological 
zoning; efforts to certify producer 
legality commercial chains (beef, 
soy); land regularisation process 
and demarcation of indigenous 




















Tax regimes and policies 
supporting migration and 
agricultural expansion; road 
infrastructure projects; energy 
infrastructure projects (oil, 
biofuels and hydroelectric); 
support for expansion of 
mining; lack of environmental 
policies and sustainable 
development policies in the 
Amazon
Ley 29763 Ley Forestal y de 
Fauna Silvestre (New Forest 
and Wildlife Act) approved but 
not yet in force; Peru–US trade 
agreement; free trade agreement 
with China on forestry and 
environmental protection; trade 
agreement Peru–EU (REDD+, 
forest certification, sustainable 
forest management); Ley 29785 
Ley de Consulta Previa (prior 






powerful cartels that 
favour illegal logging, 















Tax dependence on forest 
and mining; tax breaks for 
forest products, farming 
produce, pulp and paper; 
mining permits in protected 
areas; fiscal and non-fiscal 
concessions for food 
estate and energy estate 
development; biofuel 
development; land allocation 
for oil palm plantations
Moratorium on granting of 
new licenses and improvement 
of natural primary forest and 
peatland governance (although 
considered a weak policy due 




scale plantations and 
logging, pulp and 











































Political and economic 
incentives in agricultural 
sector (soybean and 
sugarcane agrobusiness); 
upcoming infrastructure 
projects (roads, dams); 
support for colonisation of the 
northern Amazon 
Improved forest monitoring 
of illegal logging; increased 
recognition of local tenure 
rights; legal framework on 
sustainable forest management; 
decentralisation of forest 
management 
Low (illegal loggers 
bribing forestry 
police and road 
police, but little 












and associated infrastructure 
development; hydropower 
development; local road 
construction; mining of sand, 
boulders and stone; lack of 
overarching land use policy
Subsidies for kerosene, biogas, 
micro-hydro, solar and improved 
cooking stoves; community 
forestry programme
Medium-high 
(illegal logging and 
smuggling to India 















logging exports; infrastructure 
(roads, rails and dams); mining 
and large-scale agriculture 
projects
Law No 2011/08 on Guidelines 
for Territorial Planning and 
Sustainable Development in 
Cameroon
















Infrastructure (roads and 
hydropower); self-sufficiency 
in food and cash crop 
development (rubber and 
coffee); National Socio-
Economic Development Plan; 
credit schemes to alleviate 
poverty; land allocation; 
economic development 
as main goal of Forest 
Development Strategy
Decision 380 and Decree 99; 
payment for forest environmental 
services including benefit-
sharing regulation (strong 
design, weak implementation); 
Law on Forest Protection and 
Development 2004 and Land 
Law 2003: legal foundation for 
carbon rights; National Climate 




the local level 
and in relation 
to state-owned 





Based on May et al. (2011b), Dkamela (2011), Indrarto et al. (2012), Pham et al. (2012), CEDLA and CIFOR (2011a), Forest Action and CIFOR (2011), DAR and CIFOR (2012)
* A high score on the index indicates democracy, while a low score indicates an authoritarian regime (Economist Intelligence Unit 2011)
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Box 5.1 REDD+ the Brazilian way: Integrating old sticks with new carrots
Jan Börner and Sven Wunder
Implementing REDD+ requires policies that effectively change land and forest use 
decisions. In most settings, such changes imply foregone economic benefits for land users, 
at least in the short term. Apart from implementation costs, any effective REDD+ policy 
will thus inevitably have distributional consequences. Ideally, REDD+ would maximise 
both cost effectiveness and equity. In practice, however, policy makers tend to face hard 
tradeoffs between these two objectives. 
Land ownership and forest use rights in the Brazilian Amazon are highly concentrated. The 
Brazilian Senate is now considering far-reaching liberalisations of currently restrictive land 
use legislation, in an attempt to catch up with a reality of widespread non-compliance. 
Effectively enforcing the current Brazilian Forest Code – for example, mandating the 
conservation of 80% of on-farm forests – would cost the country’s fast-growing, land-
expansive agroindustry. On the other hand, purely incentive-based REDD+ approaches 
would mean compensating landholders for not breaking existing conservation 
regulations, which is politically sensitive. At COP15 in 2009, Brazil therefore proposed a 
REDD+ approach that combines more rigid regulatory enforcement with a compensatory 
national programme of payments for environmental services (PES). 
Finding the optimal mix of regulatory sticks and PES carrots has implications not only 
for equity, but also for implementation costs. Enforcing conservation laws requires 
costly field operations, but it can also produce fine revenues that may partially offset 
implementation costs. PES, in contrast, entails considerable budget outlays, which have 
political opportunity costs vis-à-vis other government spending. Adding fairness to REDD+ 
by compensating landholders’ opportunity costs – whether legal or illegal but tolerated – 
thus comes at significant costs, especially if past good forest stewards (e.g. many Amazon 
indigenous people and traditional forest dwellers) are also to be rewarded. 
Mixed stick-and-carrot approaches have their pros and cons. As a stand-alone instrument, 
PES can be enforced simply by suspending payments to non-compliant land users. PES 
recipients will then expect to receive at least their opportunity costs in compensation. In 
conjunction with pre-existing regulations, however, PES become compliance subsidies, 
which typically will not fully compensate land users for abiding by conservation laws. 
Under such a policy mix, suspending payments may not suffice to effectively encourage 
conservation if the regulatory threat is perceived to be improbable, e.g. in remote frontier 
areas. Imperfect enforcement of the complementary stick component may also induce land 
users to pocket PES and continue business as usual. Policy makers who effectively integrate 
stick-and-carrot-based REDD+ policies will thus depend on planning tools that can anticipate 
spatially heterogeneous implementation costs and welfare effects of synergistically 
operating conservation tools. In partially decentralised environmental governance systems 
like Brazil’s, the costs of implementing environmental policies are shared between national 
and subnational governments. New benefit and cost sharing mechanisms will thus also be 
needed across administrative entities to achieve effective and equitable outcomes. 
Source: Börner et al. (2011)
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REDD+	policy	 formulation	and	 implementation.	 ey	 include	policies	on	
payments	for	environmental	services;	forest	regulations	that	foster	sustainable	
forest	 management;	 conservation,	 reforestation	 and	 a orestation;	 and	
government	expenditures	that	aim	to	increase	energy	e ciency	and	provide	
alternatives	 to	 forest	products.	But	generally	 these	policies	command	fewer	
resources	 and	 cover	 very	 limited	 areas,	 compared	 to	 policies	 that	 support	
drivers	of	deforestation	(Table	5.1).
Apart	 from	 the	 business	 sector,	 the	 state	 itself	 has	 economic	 and	 political	
interests	 in	 the	 exploitation	 and	 conversion	 of	 forest,	 as	 these	 activities	
contribute	to	economic	development	goals	and	provide	inancial	resources	for	
the	state	in	the	form	of	taxes	and	other	levies.	In	order	to	provide	incentive	
structures	it	is	essential	that	the	state	holds	a	su cient	level of autonomy	from	
economic	actors	driving	deforestation	(Karsenty	and	Ongolo	2012).	Lack	of	
autonomy	can	also	be	revealed	by	high	levels	of	collusion	between	state	and	






the	 Indonesian	Moratorium.	Most	 lobbying	 occurs	 behind	 the	 scenes,	 but	
its	e ects	are	visible	 in	inal	policy	formulation,	 limited	 implementation	of	
policies	and	low	levels	of	compliance	with	existing	policies	(Coen	2004).	In	
recent	years	Brazil	has	demonstrated	an	 increased	ability	 to	withstand	such	
pressure	compared	 to	 Indonesia,	which	has	a	 long	history	of	cosy	 relations	
between	government	o cials	and	business	interests	at	all	levels.	Illegal	logging	
licensing	 is	also	 routinely	used	 to	raise	 resources	 for	electoral	campaigns	 in	
many	of	these	countries.	In	Vietnam	the	main	challenge	relates	to	corruption	
and	collusion	 in	 state	 enterprises,	 local	 government	 and	civil	 service.	High	




break	 from	 the	 traditional	development	model	 of	 relying	on	unsustainable	
exploitation	of	natural	resources.	State	actors	in	Vietnam,	followed	by	Brazil,	
are	probably	 in	 the	best	position	 to	 independently	 support	 such	 a	 change.	
In	 all	 other	 cases,	 transformational	 change	 will	 require	 broader	 alliances	
between	parts	of	the	state	and	other	forces	able	to	break	path-dependencies.	
International	actors	and	civil	 society	can	contribute	 in	part	by	pushing	 for	
such	changes.	Norway	 is	one	of	 the	major	 international	donors	 supporting	
these	e orts	(see	Box	5.4).







e	 political	 regimes	 in	 the	 seven	 countries	 vary	 widely	 from	 democratic	
to	 authoritarian,	 as	 does	 the	 level	 of	 centralisation,	 from	 very	 centralised	












for	 a	more	detailed	analysis	of	 inclusiveness	 in	 the	consultation	process	on	
REDD+	in	Tanzania).
5.4 Policy discourse and coalitions for change 
e	media	can	be	 seen	as	a	mirror	of	ongoing	policy	processes,	 and	media 
analysis	 is	 used	 here	 to	 identify	 the	 dominant	 policy	 discourses	 and	 the	
extent	 to	which	 such	 discourses	 are	 shared	 across	 actors.	Transformational	
coalitions	use	discursive	practices	 that	 challenge	business	 as	usual	 scenarios	










in	number,	 but	 the	 level	 of	 coverage	di ers	 substantially	 among	 countries.	
Between	December	 2005	 and	 2009,	 three	major	 newspapers	 in	 Indonesia	
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Box 5.2 Linking knowledge to action: REDD+ policy making in 
Tanzania
Salla Rantala
Drawing from different types of relevant knowledge in ways that increase 
the effectiveness, efficiency and equitability of policy making is a pressing 
challenge for countries as they prepare their national REDD+ policies. Policy 
makers are increasingly dependent on brokers of the complex scientific 
knowledge related to climate change and the required regimes to address it. 
At the same time, policy outputs often reflect political bargaining processes 
between various policy actors that differ in their resources and capacities, 
rather than linear processes of evidence-based policy making. 
In Tanzania, the government-led REDD+ Task Force has welcomed 
contributions by civil society, research institutions, local governments 
and international partners to national REDD+ strategy development. 
Organisations with a strong mandate to disseminate information relevant 
to REDD+ shared their experiences in engaging with the policy process. 
While formal means often included workshops and training, the most 
frequently mentioned successful entry points to influencing policy were 
finding the right organisational allies within and outside of government for 
joint advocacy efforts, as well as subtle diplomacy with individuals high up 
in the line of command across different sectors. There was also considerable 
consensus regarding the need to showcase real local success stories in order 
to convince policy makers. The most salient challenge to linking relevant 
knowledge to REDD+ policy making was the high cost of getting the attention 
of key officials. Conveners of information-sharing events have to compete 
for the target participants’ limited time. Faced with an overwhelming choice 
of events, officials may end up basing their choice of attending an event on 
the resources available for expenses such as allowances, rather than on the 
information content of the event. 
This challenge illustrates how the channels of resources and information 
in policy making may be intertwined. Other barriers mentioned by 
interviewees in Tanzania relate to the capacity and willingness of decision 
makers to consider recommendations that diverge from their pre-existing 
views, as well as the sluggishness of the bureaucratic system in responding 
to evidence. Limiting interaction to junior officials and executive branches of 
government instead of the ‘real decision makers’ was also said to account for 














pro-REDD+	 attitudes.	 Policy	 discourse	 in	Brazil	 is	 dominated	 by	 national	
level	 state	 actors	 (26%),	but	 a	high	diversity	of	 stakeholders	 is	 represented	
in	 the	 media,	 notably	 international	 environmental	 nongovernmental	
organisations	 (NGOs),	 research	 institutes	and	domestic	civil	 society	actors.	
Indonesia	 also	 presents	 a	 high	 diversity	 of	 actors,	 especially	 international	
NGOs.	A	peculiarity	of	decentralised	Indonesia	is	the	relatively	high	number	







institutes	 follow.	But	while	 they	work	 in	 conjunction	with	 government	 in	
most	countries,	they	completely	dominate	policy	discourse	in	Cameroon	and	
in	Peru.	In	fact,	Cameroon	presents	the	weakest	level	of	government	control	
over	 policy	 discourse.	 It	 seems	 that	 REDD+	 strategies	 are	 predominantly	
pushed	by	 international	 actors,	 and	 similar	 conditions	 are	 evident	 in	Peru.	
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Table 5.2 Actors shaping the policy discourse (percentage of total 
actors expressing a position on REDD+ in media) 
Actor group Indonesia Brazil Bolivia Vietnam Nepal Cameroon Peru
State (national) 45 26 50 67 17 8 12
State (subnational) 7 2 3 0 6 0 0
Corporate 3 4 10 6 6 0 0
Intergovernmental 8 7 9 27 6 17 25
Research 
(international)




16 17 10 0 0 0 25
Research 
(national)
6 13 3 0 12 25 0




10 20 15 0 47 8 13
TOTAL% of 
organisations
100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total number of 
organisations
219 113 60 32 17 12 8
strong	alliance	with	 international	donors.	An	analysis	of	Norwegian	media	
mirrors	this,	as	the	debate	is	also	largely	shaped	by	the	Norwegian	government	







5.4.2 Absent voices and hidden discourse 
State	autonomy	vis-à-vis	agents	driving	deforestation,	government	ownership	
of	policy	processes	and	a	positive	attitude	toward	REDD+	are	preconditions	
for	 policy	 advances;	 but	 these	 conditions	 are	 by	 no	 means	 su cient	 to	
ensure	 e ective	 and	 equitable	 formulation	 of	 national	 REDD+	 strategies.	
Transformational	 change	 requires	 policy	 actors	 and	 coalitions	 to	 be	 able	
to	 lead	policy	discussions	 in	new	directions	 compared	 to	business	 as	usual	
scenarios,	 thereby	 breaking	 away	 from	 institutional	 and	 politico-economic	
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Box 5.3 Constraints to effective REDD+ policy making in Nepal 
Bryan R. Bushley and Dil Bahadur Khatri
Since the late 1970s, Nepal’s forestry sector has undergone a process of steady decentralisation 
toward increased local autonomy and community-based forest management, and a more 
inclusive national policy making process. In recent years, however, government and forestry 
officials have attempted to restrict the autonomy of forest user groups and capture more 
economic value from forests through legislation, directives and discretionary measures. 
Simultaneously, the government, international NGOs, donors and civil society have 
embraced REDD+ and are engaged in policy making and piloting processes. 
Yet, REDD+ discourses and policies have been influenced by interactions among a limited 
set of actors in the government, donor/international NGO and civil society sectors, with a 
few noticeable trends. First, the exchange of information and resources related to REDD+ is 
controlled by a few international and national NGOs implementing specific pilot projects, 
whereas government organisations are most influential in terms of shaping specific 
policies. Second, the participation of civil society actors in policy formulation is limited 
to the involvement of relatively few actors, whereas the interests of some marginalised 
groups, such as women and Dalits (low-caste ‘untouchables’), are underrepresented. 
Third, there has been no direct involvement of private sector entities in piloting or policy 
making processes. Despite these deficiencies, new configurations of actors are emerging 
around piloting and awareness-raising efforts and advocacy campaigns for the rights of 
forest-dependent communities. 
There are also a number of specific policy constraints that could threaten the long-term 
viability of REDD+ in Nepal. First and foremost is the lack of a clear legal basis for the 
establishment of carbon rights. Related to this is the issue of weak and ambiguous land 
tenure rights, especially for forest-dependent communities. Without either of these, it will 
be difficult to garner strong internal or external financial and political support for REDD+. 
Lack of clarity and consensus on adopting a fund-based vs. a market-based approach to 
REDD+ is also a major constraint. Another significant barrier is the lack of an inclusive, 
just and marketable benefit-sharing mechanism. A benefit-sharing pilot was carried out 
in three REDD+ piloting sites, with a minority (40%) of the criteria for benefits based on 
carbon stocks and a majority (60%) based on various social factors, such as the proportion 
of indigenous people, women, and disadvantaged groups in each community. But such 
an approach has no basis in existing carbon markets, may not be viable in a global carbon-
trading scheme, and excludes other land managers besides community forest user groups. 
Finally, there is a need for an overarching democratic governance framework that would 
improve benefit-sharing mechanisms, oversee monitoring, reporting and verification, 
and address conflict resolution related to REDD+ implementation.
In Nepal, it appears that REDD+ may be reinforcing the centralising tendencies of the state 
while marginalising other important stakeholders. However, new modes of collaboration 
are also emerging, with the potential to transform existing institutions of forest governance. 
If these collaborations can successfully address the constraints outlined above, they 
may contribute to the realisation of a more effective, efficient and equitable REDD+ 
mechanism.
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in	part	 from	 state	 elites	 and	business	 interests.	Coalitions	 can	be	based	on	




that	 business	 views	 and	 business–state	 relations	 are	 barely	 explored	 in	 the	
media.	 is	is	the	case	even	in	countries	such	as	Brazil	and	Indonesia,	where	
the	role	of	the	business	sector	is	quite	signiicant.	In	general,	business	tends	
to	 lobby	policy	makers	behind	 the	 scenes	 (Coen	2004).	 is	 is	 a	universal	
phenomenon,	and	more	so	where	such	lobbying	is	perceived	as	problematic	
by	the	public.	When	such	pressure	entails	 illegal	activities,	secrecy	becomes	












Apart	 from	 identifying	 key	 actors,	 the	media	 analysis	 helps	 to	 characterise	
the	 REDD+	 policy	 positions	 of	 these	 actors.	 eir	 single	 policy	 positions	
have	 been	 aggregated	 into	 broader	 categories	 to	 identify	 coalitions	 for	
transformation	 change,	 and	 those	 resisting	 such	 change.	 e	 results	 of	 the	
analysis	are	presented	next.1	








Box 5.4 A media-based analysis of the REDD+ discourse in Norway
Laila Borge
In 2010, the well-known climate scientist James E. Hansen said that the main 
effect of Norway’s funding of forest protection would be a clearer conscience 
for members of that oil nation. Norwegian environmental minister Erik Solheim 
quickly retorted in a letter to Aftenposten (the leading Norwegian newspaper): 
“Norway supports efforts to prevent deforestation because this is the quickest 
and most cost efficient way to achieve deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. (...) 
Norway has shown international leadership with its climate and forest initiative, 
and we have made several other countries support this important work”. This 
latter view has been the most widely expressed in the Norwegian media.
In 2007, during the international climate negotiations in Bali, Norway pledged 
NOK 15 billion (US $2.6 billion) towards efforts to reduce emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. The Government 
of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative was established in 
2008 to implement that pledge. The initiative had broad political support and 
the Norwegian media were overwhelmingly optimistic about the initiative. 
Rainforest protection was presented as a simple, inexpensive and effective 
way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Several commentators also pointed 
out that, by funding forest conservation, Norway could quickly become 
carbon neutral.
Critical voices have grown louder in recent years, mainly from the research 
community and civil society. No one denies the value of the initiative’s 
purpose, but many question whether it is possible to measure and control 
its effects and point out that most of the money has not yet been released. 
The Norwegian government is also being criticised for financing projects that 
destroy rainforests through the Government Pension Fund. Some media have 
brandished some unintended negative consequences of REDD+. In addition, 
the Norwegian government is criticised for buying its way out of less popular 
domestic CO2 reductions. 
Overall, however, the Norwegian media have remained positive, and Norway’s 
International Climate and Forest Initiative is seen as the most successful of the 
government’s efforts to reduce emissions. The Norwegian debate is largely 
shaped by the government and domestic environmental NGOs. The Brazilian 
government has also been quite visible in the Norwegian press. The most cited 
actors are the (former) Norwegian Minister of the Environment and Minister 
of Development Cooperation, Erik Solheim, and the Norwegian Prime Minister 
Jens Stoltenberg. 
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costs	of	large-scale	businesses	related	forest	conversion	and	warn	that	REDD+	
should	 not	 undermine	 economic	 development.	 Given	 the	 low	 level	 of	
autonomy	of	state	actors	illustrated	earlier,	such	statements	are	consistent	with	
a	situation	in	which	part	of	the	state	apparatus	sides	with	business	interests	
that	 proit	 from	 rents	 from	 ranching,	 plantation	 development,	 logging	
and	 mining.	 But	 opinions	 of	 state	 actors	 are	 not	 uniform.	 For	 example,	
in	 Indonesia,	 the	 conservation	 branch	 of	 the	Ministry	 of	 Forestry	 and	 the	












for	 providing	 forest-related	 environmental	 services,	 since	 the	 Vietnamese	
government	is	subsuming	forest	PES	under	REDD+	policies.	 e	media	report	
two	instances	in	which	state-owned	enterprises	disagree	with	the	Vietnamese	
government.	 Despite	 this	 resistance,	 it	 would	 appear	 that	 in	Vietnam	 the	
national	government	is	trying	to	impose	a	change	in	direction	in	business	as	
usual	vis-à-vis	some	state-owned	business	interests	(Pham	et al.	2012).






is	no	 indication	of	a	broader	 transformational	coalition	 that	might	 include	
other	 actors	 such	 as	 representatives	 of	 business	 or	 government.	 A	 number	
of	 international	 environmental	 NGOs	 side	 with	 domestic	 civil	 society	 in	
expressing	their	concerns	about	the	potential	of	REDD+	to	limit	forest	access	
for	local	users	or	even	dispossess	forest-dependent	groups.	But	this	attempt	to	
push	policy	makers	to	reconsider	 local	 forest	 tenure	arrangements	does	not	
ind	a	response	in	the	discourse	of	the	dominant	coalition.
Concerns	 about	 weak	 governance	 and	 corruption	 are	 voiced	 by	 both	
international	and	domestic	civil	society	actors	in	Indonesia.	In	particular,	they	
stress	 the	danger	 that	 corruption	might	 lead	 to	 ine ective	 implementation	
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of	REDD+.	Such	a	position	can	be	understood	as	a	call	for	transformational	
change	 and	 a	denunciation	of	 collusion	 and	 capture,	which	often	underlie	
business	as	usual	coalitions.	Yet,	such	concerns	remain	unaddressed	in	most	
other	 countries,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 weak	 governance	 is	 a	major	 political	
constraint	in	most	countries.
e	main	demand	of	the	dominant	domestic	civil	society	coalition	in	Nepal	
is	 for	 a	 stronger	 role	 of	 local	 forest	 user	 groups	 in	 accessing	 beneits	 from	
REDD+.	 is	view	is	opposed	by	local	government,	while	state	government	
seems	unengaged	with	REDD+	issues	in	media	debates.	Forest	user	federations	
form	 the	only	REDD+	coalition	 engaging	with	 the	media	 in	 this	 country.	
Such	a	prominent	position	 is	 in	part	 linked	with	the	 long	history	of	 forest	





with	 indigenous	 organisations	 a	 concern	 about	 the	 inclusion	 of	 plantation	














of	 deforestation	 are	 powerful	 players	 and	 try	 to	 inluence	policy	 decisions.	
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5.5 Conclusions 
e	 above	 evidence	 illustrates	how	 four	 important	 factors,	which	 can	help	
overcome	 the	 politico-economic	 constraints	 to	 policy	 reform	 and	 lead	 to	
e ective	and	equitable	REDD+	policy	design,	operate	in	di erent	countries.	
ey	are:	a	high	level	of	autonomy	of	state	actors	from	business	interests	linked	
to	 forest	 exploitation	 and	 conversion;	 ownership	 and	 control	 by	 national	
governments	 of	 national	REDD+	 strategies;	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 inclusiveness	
in	policy	processes;	and	the	presence	of	coalitions	for	transformation	change.	
e	indings	illustrate	that	in	most	countries	these	factors	were	neither	present	
before	 the	 introduction	 of	REDD+,	nor	 are	 they	 currently	 being	 achieved	
–	instead	countries	struggle	with	reform	processes	in	and	beyond	the	forest	
sector.	One	common	challenge	in	all	seven	countries	is	the	level	of	autonomy	
of	 state	 actors.	While	 state	 rhetoric,	 expressed	 in	media	 stances,	 illustrates	
‘win–win’	 scenarios	 where	 economic	 objectives	 go	 hand	 in	 hand	 with	
environmental	protection,	state	actors	 seem	to	ind	it	extremely	di cult	 to	
embrace	such	a	view	in	practice.	High	dependence	of	economic	development	
on	 unsustainable	 exploitation	 of	 natural	 resources	 is	 deeply	 engrained	















build	 domestic	 constituencies	 that	 challenge	 powerful	 interests	 are	 evident	
in	the	media	debate	in	some	countries,	but	these	remain	minority	coalitions.	





as	 a	 threat	 to	 economic	 development.	 Consequently,	 powerful	 economic	
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interests	 lobby	 governments	 to	 adopt	 policies	 that	 reduce	 the	 e ectiveness	
of	REDD+	or	further	slow	decision	making,	as	evident	from	the	experience	
of	 the	 Indonesia	Moratorium	on	Forest	Conversion	and	 the	 current	 threat	
in	Brazil	 to	 revise	 the	Forestry	Code	 to	 reduce	 the	 requirements	 for	 forest	
protection.	
What	 is	 needed	 now	 are	 coalitions	 capable	 of	 breaking	 up	 such	 path-
dependencies:	new,	broad	and	inclusive	alliances	that	use	scientiic	expertise	
and	 technical	 and	 institutional	 capacity	 to	 overcome	 a	 traditional	 policy	





model,	 disband	 dominant	 coalitions	 and	 attract	 support	 from	 state	 and	
business	actors	willing	to	take	on	these	challenges.	
